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PARAMETERS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: AN APPLICATION OF
PATH ANALYSIS TO A PROBLEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
JOHN HAGAN*
A sociological concern with the process of
criminal sentencing is well-established.' Similarly well-demonstrated is a sociological inter2
est in the process of criminal prosecution.
Surprisingly, however, the two concerns have
not been linked systematically in empirical research. The tendency, instead, has been to treat
sentencing and prosecution as separate dependent variables, to be linked individually to other
variables in the legal process. The current
study combines consideration of prosecution
and sentencing, using the techniques of path
analysis.3 Before turning to the analysis itself,
however, we will review several approaches
4
taken to the study of criminal prosecution.
THE LirRnA:upm
The process of criminal prosecution is a sub*Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of
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E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ArTITDES IN SENTENcING (1961) ; S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM
A BEHAVIORIAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); Lemert and
Rosberg, The Administration of Justice to Minority Groups in Los Angeles County, 11 UNIv.
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(1948) ; Sellin, Race Prejudice in the Administration of Justice, 41 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 212 (1935).
2 F.
MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To
CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970); D.
J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966);
Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A
Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S.
780 (1956).
3 For basic discussions of the techniques of path
analysis, see Heise, Problems in Path Analysis
and Causal Inference, 1969 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 38 (E. Borgatta ed. 1969); Land, Principles of Path Analysis, 1969 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 3 (E. Borgatta ed. 1969).
4 A review of the sentencing literature has
previously been provided in Hagan, Extra-Legal
Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 357 (1974).
Discussions of criminal sentencing are largely
atheoretical, focusing on the role of legal and extralegal variables in the judicial process. Discussions of criminal prosecution are similarly attentive to these variables, while additionally
concerned with linking such variables into theoretical perspectives on the prosecutorial process. For

ject of international concern 5, an issue of constitutional debate6 , a forum for social theoretical speculation7 , and a focus of empirical
research.8 For current purposes, we will restrict our attention to several theoretical and
empirical discussions of criminal prosecution.
Two dominant theoretical approaches can be
discerned. Although the approaches are not
mutually exclusive, they differ in emphasis, focusing on two distinct concepts: bureaucratization and class conflict.
Blumberg focuses on the role of bureaucratization in Anglo-American systems of criminal
justice.9 Drawing on Weber's discussions of
the process of rationalization in modern legal
systems, it is argued that the proper focus for
study lies in the organization of the criminal
court: "Sociologists and others have focused
their attention on the deprivations and social
disabilities of such variables as race, ethnicity,
and social class as being the source of an accused person's defeat in a criminal court.
Largely overlooked is the variable of the court
organization itself, which possesses a thrust,
purpose, and direction of its own." ' 0 Blumberg
argues that bureaucratic demands for efficiency
exert an exogenous influence on the prosecution process. These organizational pressures
are operationalized procedurally through the acthese reasons, the current review is confined to
discussions of criminal prosecution.
5 See 8 Am. J. COMPARATIVE L. (1970) (entire
volume).
6 Chambliss, The Unconstitutionality of Plea
Bargaining, 83 H.atv. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
7A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967) ; W.
CHAMBLISS & P_

SEIDMAN, LAw, ORDER, AND

POWER (1971); Blumberg, The Practice of Law
as a Confidence Game, 1 L. & Soc'Y REV. 15
(1967); Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological
Featuresof the Penal Code in a Public Defender's
Offlce, 12 SoCIAL PROBLEMS 255 (1965).
8 Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations:
A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 780 (1956) ; Note, Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. Pa. L. REv.
865 (1964).
90A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967).
' Id. at 19.
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tions of defense counsel, client and prosecutor
in the process of plea negotiation.:"
Chambliss and Seidman differ from Blumberg in assigning an intervening role to procedural variables in the causal sequence.' 2 Arguing from a Marxian view of class conflict,
negotiation between defense counsel and prosecutor is conceptualized as a mediating mechanism that facilitates protection of the powerful
and exploitation of the powerless. Procedural
variables thus assume an endogenous position,
subject to the direct effects of the social class
position of the defendants involved: "How favorable a 'bargain' one can strike with the
prosecutor in the pretrial confrontations is a
direct function of how politically and economically powerful the defendant is. In terms of
day-to-day prosecutorial activities, what this
comes down to is that the lower class, indigent, and minority group member is most
likely to be prosecuted for his offenses. . . ." Is
Moving from theory to research, two empirical studies are available for review. Vetri has
published results of a survey questionaire completed by prosecutors in forty-three states. 14 It
is important to note that the response rate to
the questionnaire was low (40 per cent), and
also that the accuracy of the responses obtained is dependent on the honesty and perceptual acuity of the respondents involved. Nonetheless, the findings are of interest. Among
findings relevant to our discussion, it is reported that prosecutors consider prior convictions, type of offense, and multiple charges as
important factors in the decision to alter charges.
Newman's study of the prosecution process
used as its data source the recollections of
ninety-seven felons under active sentence.' 5
Although this study is also limited by the accuracy of the respondents' reports, it is again of
importance in terms of the insights offered for
further research. Data reported by Newman
cast doubt on the class based hypotheses of
Chambliss and Seidman. For example, when
11 Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game, 1 L & Soc'y REv. 15 (1967).
12 W.
CHAMBLISS AND R. SEIDMAN, supra note
7, ch. 19.
13 Id. at 412.
'4 Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises
by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 865 (1964).
15 Newman, supra note 8.

defendants are compared in terms of their initial pleas, no significant differences are found
by education, occupation, and residence. Similarly, "[a] analysis of the sample of offenders
showed no clear-cut categories separating bargained and non-bargained convictions." '6 Nevertheless, Newman reports that among those
cases where negotiation was perceived to have
occurred, approximately 33 per cent involved
communication regarding alteration of charges,
while 67 per cent involved discussion of sentencing considerations. A concluding hypothesis suggests that "[t]he way bargaining now
works, the more experienced criminals can manipulate legal processes to obtain light sentences and better official records ....
'7
This discussion of the literature relating to
criminal prosecution suggests several different
themes. Chambliss and Seidman clearly hypothesize that class conflict, operationalized
through the extra-legal attributes of the defendants, is a dominant disadvantaging factor
in the process of criminal prosecution. Just as
clearly, Blumberg argues that the prosecution
process is guided by a set of bargaining procedures whose thrust is constrained more by organizational priorities than class interests.
Newman, in contrast, argues that it is the
"conviction-wise" offender who benefits from
the prosecutorial process. Finally, Vetri indicates that a number of more conventional legal
variables must be considered in discussions of
criminal prosecution.
Unfortunately, although the literature surrounding the prosecution process is helpful in
isolating potentially important variables, it
does not suggest a set of propositions sufficiently precise to allow a deductive model-testing approach to the research problem.' 8 In response to this situation, techniques of path
analysis are explored as a means of inductively
determining causal linkages between the variables concerned. At the same time, an assessment is attempted of the overall impact of factors involved in the prosecutorial process. The
intent is to provide an empirical grounding for
additional theory construction and research.' 9
16 Id. at 789.
17 Id. at 790.

IsSee H.

BLALocx,

CAUSAL

NONEXPmUmENTAL RESEARcH

19 Heise, supra note 3, at 64.
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THE SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

The sample consists of 1018 cases, involving
over 1500 charges, drawn at random from files
covering a six month period of prosecutions in
a medium-sized western Canadian city.

20

Our

20 For a discussion of criminal prosecution in
Canada, see Grossman, The Role of the Prosecutor in Canada, 18 AM. J. ComPARAvE L. 498
(1970). Grossman generally concludes that criminal prosecution in Canada is much like that in the
United States.
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primary interest was in the offender as the
unit of analysis. Thus, it was necessary to select the salient charge facing each offender.
This was accomplished by choosing the offense
assigned the most severe sentence. If none of
the charges received sentence (i.e., if all
charges were dismissed), or if the sentent.es
were of equal severity, the offense providing the
most severe sentencing option by statute, was
chosen. Three groups of independent variables,
presented in Table I, are considered in the

TABLE I: VARIABLES
Scale

Variable

Notation

(1)

Indian & Metis

(2)

X1

Race

White

X2

Socioeconomic Status
(Index: Edward's SocialEconomic Group of
Occupations)

Professional, Technical and Related Workers
Business Managers, Officials, and Proprietors
Clerical and Related Workers
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Related Workers
Operatives and Related Workers
Laborers

X3

Prior Arrests

None

(1)

One or More

(2)

X4

Legal Seriousness of Initial
Charge (measured as
maximum statutory
sentence)

6 Months
18 Months
2 Years
3 Years
5 Years

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

7 Years
10 Years
14 Years
Life or Death

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

X5

Number of Charges

One
Two
Three
Four
Five

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Six
Seven
Eight
Nine or more

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

X6

Defense Counsel

No

(1)

Yes

(2)

X7

Initial Plea

Guilty
Plea Reserved or Withheld
Not Guilty

(1)
(2)
(3)

X8

Charge Alterations

No Charge Alteration
Secondary Charge Alteration
Primary Charge Alteration

(1)
(2)
(3)

X9

Final Disposition
Sentence

Charge Dismissed
Absolute Discharge
Conditional Discharge or Fine
Probation
Prison

X10

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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analysis. A brief discussion of each set of variables follows, with the order of presentation
representing an assumed sequence of causal
priority.
The first group of variables consists of extra-legal offender characteristics: race (X1)
and socio-economic status (X 2 ). The minority
group represented in the sample is of Indian
and Metis descent.2 ' In several respects, the
presence of Native persons in the sample can
be considered an asset of this research. In
comparison with other North American
groups, it can plausibly be argued that Indian
and Metis defendants understand less and resist least their fate in the hands of the law.
Thus, if race in itself is a disadvantaging factor in criminal prosecution, it would seem
likely that Native persons would be among
those experiencing the undesired effects.
The racial background of the defendant was
indicated as (1) white or (2) Indian or Metis
on the basis of designation as such in the case
file. 22 Additional information on the current or
customary occupation of the defendant was
gathered from the files, and socio-economic
status was then indicated on the basis of Edward's Social-Economic Grouping of Occupa23
tions.
The second group of variables includes legally defined offender and offense characteristics: prior arrest (X 3 ), legal seriousness of
the initial charge (X 4 ), and the number of
charges (X,). Information regarding the presence or absence of prior arrests and the number of charges facing the offender was indicated directly from the files. The seriousness of
the initial charge selected for analysis was
operationally defined in terms of the maximum
sentence provided for the offense in the Criminal Code of Canada.
The third group of variables involves procedural factors: presence of defense counsel

(X 6 ), initial plea (X 7 ), and charge alteration
(Xs). The presence or absence of defense
counsel and the nature of the initial plea were
recorded from the files. The type of initial pleawas then ranked according to the intensity
of the denial of guilt indicated: (1) plea of
guilty, (2) plea reserved or withheld, (3) pleaof not guilty.
Measurement of charge alteration presented
a more difficult problem. Discussions of charge
alteration have typically focused on the distinction between situationally and necessarily included offenses, 2 4 the nature of the interaction
between the negotiating parties,2 5 and the disjunction between the expected and effected
sentencing "considerations." 26 However, in the
jurisdiction under study, judges customarily
sentence offenses concurrently. Thus, more important than any of the previously mentioned
concerns, for the purpose of predicting final
disposition, is an indication of the particular
charge being altered. In short, the most important consideration for the defendant is whether
or not the most serious charge facing him is
changed. Thus, charge alterations are ranked
in our analysis as follows: (1) no charge alteration, (2) secondary charge alteration, (3).
27
primary charge alteration.
The dependent variable for this analysis isthe outcome of the defendant's case. To provide a comprehensive assessment of the prosecution and sentencing process, it was necessary
to consider not only those persons who were
actually sentenced, but also persons whose
cases were dismissed. To demonstrate the implications of considering the latter group, the
dependent variable was coded first with, and
second without, the inclusion of this set of defendants. The ranking of the variable was determined by the decision of guilt and/or restriction of civil liberties imposed; the two
codings are presented in Table 1.28 For pur-

21 The term "Metis" refers to persons of mixed,
in this case white and Indian, ancestry.
22 Persons of Indian and Metis backgrounds are
combined in one category in the same sense that
persons of mixed white and Negro background are
usually treated synonymously with Negroes, for
the purpose of study. The concern is not with the
biological accuracy of these designations, but
rather with the presumed consequences of the attribution of racial status.
23 For a discussion of this scale see F. MILLER,
supra Note Z.

Sudnow, supra note 7.
Blumberg, supra note 11.
26 Newman, supra note 8.
27 The frequency distribution of charge alterations is as follows: (1) no charge alteration:
N = 594;
(2) secondary charge alteration:
N = 326; (3) primary charge alteration: N = 98.
28 The distinction between charge dismissal and
absolute discharge is based on the acknowledgement of guilt involved in the latter disposition.
Each of the following dispositions, conditional discharge or fine, probation, and prison involves a
24
25
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poses of clarity, the first ranking is designated
as "final disposition," and the second as "sentence."
The data are examined using techniques of
path analysis and multiple regression procedures. Dichotomized measures included in the
analysis are treated as "dummy variables," 29
while the remaining ordinal variables are
treated as interval measures. This strategy is
in agreement with arguments presented by
32
30
Labovitz, 31 Boyle,
Bohrnstedt and Carter,
33
and Land. Within the field of the sociology
of law, a precedent for this approach is avail34
able in the work of Cartwright and Schwartz.
successive increase in the curtailment of the civil
liberties of the offender. The frequency distribution
of final dispositions is as follows: (1) charge dismissal: N = 142; (2)
absolute discharge:
N = 25; (3)
conditional discharge or fine:
N =678; (4) probation: N =74; (5) prison:
N = 99.
29 For a discussion of the use of "dummy variables" in regression analysis, see Boyle, Path Analysis and Ordinal Data, 75 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 461
(1970).
30 Bohrnstedt and Carter, Robustness in Regression, Analysis. 1971 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY
118 (H. L. Costner ed. 1971).
31 Labovitz, The Assignment of Numbers to
Rank Order Categories, 35 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL

REV.

515 (1970); Labovitz, Some Observations on
Measurement and Statistics, 46 SOCIAL FORCES 151
(1967).
32 Boyle, supra note 29.
33 Land, su¢pra note 3.
34 Cartwright and Schwartz, The Invocation of
Legal Norms: An Empirical Investigation of

THE ANALYSIS

The analysis is carried out in two stages,
corresponding to the two codings of the dependent variable. The first stage of the analysis
involves the eight independent variables and
final disposition (Xg). Correlation and path
coefficients relating the nine variables involved
in this stage of the analysis are presented in
Table II. Correlation coefficients (rj) are presented in the upper right-hand section of the
Table, while path coefficients (pij) are presented in the lower left-hand section of the
Table. Following the inductive strategy described earlier, a causal model was developed
and presented in Figure I. Path coefficients
were selected for the model (from Table II)
on the basis of two criteria: (1) attainment of
statistical significance at the .01 level, and (2)
Durkheim and Weber, 38 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REv.
340 (1973).
Labovitz, supra note 30 at 523, argues that, ...
treating ordinal variables as if they are interval
has these advantages: (1) the use of more powerful, sensitive, better developed and interpretable
statistics with known sampling error, (2) the retention of more knowledge about the characteristics of the data, and (3) greater versatility in statistical manipulation...." Similiarly impressed by
the advantages of such procedures, Bohrnstedt and
Carter, supra note 29 at 132, advise that, "...
when one has a variable which is measured at
least at the ordinal level, parametric statistics not
only can be, but should be, applied." (emphasis
added).

TABLE II:
Correlation and Path Coefficients
(N = 1018)
PATH
COEFFICIENTS

M

N,

.15

X,

X2
X3
X4
Xe
X6
X7
X8
X9

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
____

______________________

.15"*
.18**
.10
.01
-. 01
.01
.04
.01

-. 03
.14**
-. 01
.05
-. 03
- .06
.08

X4

.17
-. 01
-. 09
.12**
.05
.04
- .01
.13**

.11
.16
-. 07
-. 01
.18**
.18**
- .06
.18**

M

.03
-. 01
.12
-. 01
.20**
-. 05
.32**
.24**

Xa

.01
-. 03
.06
.17
.20
.53**
.08
.12*

X7

.03
-. 01
.05
.26
.06
.55
.22**
-. 31*

X

-. 04
-. 08
.05
-. 01
.35
.26
.27

I

X,

.07
.13
.13
.12
.16
-. 04
-. 25
- .27

-. 30**

* Statistically significant at the .01 level.

** Statistically significant at the .01 level and explains more than one per cent of the variation in the endogenous
variable.
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explanation of more than one per cent of the
variation in the endogenous variable. 35 The
resulting model can be discussed in terms of
the three groupings of variables originally described.
Our attention is directed first to the three
procedural variables: defense counsel, initial
plea, and charge alteration. Charge alteration
has an inverse direct effect on final disposition
(P9s) of -. 30, indicating that as the primacy
of charge alteration increases, the severity of
final disposition diminishes. It is significant to
note that there is an element of conceptual overlap involved in this relationship. In those cases
of primary charge alteration where the prosecutor withdraws all charges against the defendant, the final disposition is predetermined: the
case is dismissed. Thus, in these cases, the
prosecutor effectively imposes the final judgment. The relationship between charge alteration and final disposition reflects this aspect of
the prosecutor's role in the decision-making
process.
The defendant's initial plea has an inverse
direct effect on final disposition (p97) of -. 31.
35 The F-test is used as the test of significance.
For a discussion of this test, see H. BLALocK, SoCiAL STAIsiics (1960). For a discussion of the
liabilities of using significance tests alone as the
criterion for selecting causal paths, see Heise,
supra note 3 at 61, and Hagan, supra note 4.

Assertion of innocence, in short, is linked to
favorability of disposition. The nature of this
causal sequence is elaborated with consideration
of the role of defense counsel. Presence of
defense counsel operates indirectly through plea
and charge alteration to again effect inversely
the severity of final disposition. With initial
plea alone as the mediating variable, the indirect
effect of defense counsel on final disposition
(P7sP97) is -. 16. Added to this is the indirect
influence of defense counsel operating through
initial plea and charge alteration (P76PrPs9s -. 03). The resulting estimate of the indirect
effect of defense counsel on final disposition is
-. 19.
Our focus shifts next to the legal variables
included in the model. Each legal variable directly affects final disposition, as well as directly or indirectly affecting a procedural variable. Final disposition is linked: (1) with the
initial charge, by a path coefficient (p94) of
.18; (2) with a number of charges, by a
path coefficient (p95) of .24; and (3) with prior
alone is equal in importance to that of charge
arrests, by a path coefficient (p93) of .13. Thus
the seriousness of the initial charge, the number
of immediate charges, and the number of prior
arrests are all substantively and causally related
to final disposition. It is appropriate to note,
however, that none of the legal variables taken

JOHN HAGAN
alteration in its direct effect on final disposition.
Seriousness of the initial charge and the
number of charges are also related directly to
the presence of defense counsel by respective
path coefficients (p64p65) of .18 and .20.
Further, the number of charges operates
through presence of defense counsel to produce
an indirect effect on the initial plea (P,,Po)
of .11. Finally, the number of charges facing an
offender has a direct effect on charge alteration
(p5s) of .32. As one might expect, then, the
number of offenses available for negotiation is
related causally to the probability of alteration
in charges.
Our attention turns finally to the role of
extra-legal offender characteristics in the prosecution and sentencing process. Links between
these and remaining variables in the model are
as conspicuous in their absence as they are in
their presence. Thus, there are no direct links
between extra-legal offender characteristics and
the procedural variables or final disposition.
Percentage comparisons, by race, for the three
procedural variables, are provided in Table III.
Thus, while 33.4 per cent of the white defendants retained counsel, 35.1 per cent of the
Native defendants were also represented by
counsel; while 26.2 per cent of the white defendants entered pleas of not guilty, 30.8 per
cent of the Native defendants also denied their
guilt; and while 9.6 per cent of the whites received primary charge alterations, 9.1 per cent
of the Native persons similarly benefited from
alterations in -primary charges. These findings

TABLE III:
Proportion of White and Native Offenders
Retaining Counsel, Pleading Guilty, and
Receiving Charge Alterations
Procedural Variables
Race

Defense
Counsel
Retained

Initial
Plea of
Not Guilty

Primary
Charge
Alteration

White

33.4%
(291)

26.2%
(226)

9.6%
(86)

Indian &
Meis

35.1%
(40)

30.8%
(36)

9.1%
(11)
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suggest that Indian and Metis defendants are
involved at a rate similar to whites in the procedural maneuvers that characterize the prosecutorial process.
It is of interest to note that the connection
of extra-legal offender characteristics to the
remainder of the model is through the mediating influence of legal variables. Thus, race is
linked directly to prior arrests by a path coefficient (p31) of .18, while socio-economic status
has a direct effect on initial charge of .14.
Finally, the direct effect of race on socioeconomic status is indicated by a path coefficient
(p21) of .15. Summarizing, the effect of race
and socio-economic status on final disposition is
indirect, and mediated by legal categorizations.
In the second stage of our analysis, our attention is directed to only those offenders who
actually receive sentence; those offenders
whose cases are dismissed are eliminated from
the sample. Correlation and path coefficients
relating to this phase of the analysis are presented in Table IV, and the resulting path diagram is -pictured in Figure II. Criteria used
in selecting path coefficients for the diagram are
identical to those used in the first phase of the
analysis.
The salient differences between the first and
second path diagrams involve the legal and procedural variables. In Figure II, the seriousness
of the initial charge (p10,4-=.50) and prior
record (p10,3 = .24) are both increased in their

importance as predictors of the sentence imposed. In contrast, the number of charges
(pio,s),
(p.0,7),

defense counsel (p10,6), initial plea
and charge alteration (plo,s) each

account for 'less than one per cent of the variation in sentencing. In brief, the procedural
variables are decreased in importance, while the
legal variables are increased in their influence.
There are two immediate implications of these
findings. First, the procedural variables (i.e.,
defense counsel, initial plea, and charge alteration) are clearly of less consequence for sentencing than for the dispositional process considered in broader terms (i.e., with cases of
charge dismissals included). Second, the increased importance of initial charge seriousness
in sentencing heightens somewhat the indirect
effect of socio-economic status. Thus, as a result
of lower socio-economic status and defendants
being charged with more serious offenses, the
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TABLE IV:
Correlation and Path Coefficients
(N = 1018)

PATHCOEFFICIENTS

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
X,

X,
.17"*
.16*
.07
.01
-. 02
.01
-. 05
.06

X2

XS
Y-

X5
X6
X1
X8

X10

Xi

X

.17

.16
.05

.03
.18**
.01
-. 01
-. 05
-. 09
.07

-.12**
.09
.05
.06
-. 02
.24**

X,
.08
.19
-. 10
.03
.14**
.15**
-. 12**
.50**

X

X6

.02
.01
.09
.02

-. 01
.02
.05
.14
.25

.24**
.01
.45**
.10*

.54**
.20**
.03

XT
.02
-. 01
.07
.21
.15
.56
.13**
-. 01

X8
-. 06
-. 11
.04
-. 08
.51
.36
.28

X9
.15
.19
.21
.50
.10
.10
.12
-. 07

-. 09

* Statistically significant at the .01 level.

** Statistically significant at the .01 level and explains more than one per cent of the variation in the endogenous
variable.

indirect effect of socio-economic status on sentence (p1o,4p4,2) is .09. The direct effect of
socio-economic status on sentence (P10,2) is .07.
The result is a combined total effect (pIo,4p4,2 +
P10,2) of .16.
DIscussIoN AND CONCLUSIONS

The first stage of our analysis revealed that
the presence of defense counsel, the initial plea,
and charge alteration played a major role in

[ACE (X1 )

determining final disposition. Race and socioeconomic status were not significant influences
in this process. Thus, the first phase of our
analysis replicates several of Newman's find-

ings; support is also provided for Blumberg's
argument that organizationally constrained
procedures exert an influence in the court
process that is independent of extra-legal offender characteristics. These data are not supportive of the conflict perspective, as presented

1 8
e=.99

STOIoo
T-ECONO
S X)mi "<18

II.1

-12 e=.97

24J

.50

1 2,,=.8

e=.81
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by Chambliss and Seidman. Several comments
may help to place this conclusion in proper
context.
A literal translation of the conflict perspective into the study of criminal prosecution
overlooks the extensive social sifting that occurs in the earliest phases of the legal process.
It should be noted that although variation in
the socio-economic status of offenders in our
sample was statistically sufficient for analysis,
it was at the same time limited in theoretically
relevant terms. Assignment of the numbers one
through six to each of Edward's Social Economic Groupings of Occupations (see Table I)
resulted in a mean offender status of 4.97, and
a standard deviation of 1.31. In short, the socio-economic status of offenders prosecuted
was persistently low. Thus, the salience of
class-linked factors at points preceding actual
prosecution may have muted the potential importance of such factors in later stages of the
dispositional process.
Second, it is important to note that in the
charges initially filed against offenders, there
is some indication of the process of social sifting. Lower socio-economic status offenders are
charged with more serious offenses, while Native offenders more often have prior records.
The importance of such class-linked factors became apparent in the second stage of our analysis. The seriousness of the offense charged
against lower socio-economic status defendants
was revealed as a mediating variable in the
more severe sentences received by this group
of offenders.
Findings reported in both phases of the
analysis have implications for issues posed in
Newman's research. In neither of the causal
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models presented is prior record prominantly
linked to the process of charge alteration.
However, confirmation is provided for the expectation that offenders with more extensive
cases (i.e., involving multiple offenses) are
more likely to experience alterations in
charges. This finding supports a hypothesis
that offenders often may be systematically
"over-charged" in anticipation of "rewards" to
be distributed later in the bargaining process.
At the same time, it is significant that the
number of charges is related both to prior record and charge alteration, while prior record
has a negligible direct effect on charge alteration. This finding serves to question the initial
causal importance assigned in Newman's data
to a prior conviction history.
The benefits of charge alteration become obscure in the second phase of our analysis. Here
it is revealed that presence of defense counsel,
initial plea, and charge alteration are relatively
unimportant for those offenders who are actually sentenced. This finding suggests that
"considerations" won in early stages of the
legal process may ultimately prove illusionary,
a finding that fits well with Blumberg's characterization of the bargaining process as a "confidence game." Notwithstanding the significance of this finding, this phase of the analysis
also suggests the importance of considering
those offenders who are able to avoid conviction and sentencing through the help of defense counsel and protestations of innocence. If
the full effects of the prosecution process are
to be realized, it will be important for future
research to attend to those defendants whose
cases are dismissed, as well as to those who
are actually sentenced.

